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CHAPTER 8 
Civil Procedure 
JACQUELINE L. ALLEN* 
§ 8.1. Massachusetts Tort Claims Act- Notice. Since the passage in 
1978 of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, codified as chapter 258 of 
the General Laws, Massachusetts courts frequently have been called 
upon to interpret its provisions. Of particular interest to courts, aQd 
practitioners, are the notice provisions contained in chapter 258, section 
4. Under section 4, a plaintiff wishing to bring suit against a governmental 
entity for the negligence of its employees must, within two years after 
the cause of action arose, give written notice of the claim to the proper 
executive officer. Chapter 258 does not provide expressly any circum-
stances under which this two year period may be tolled, or extended. In 
the 1982 decision of Weaver v. Commonwealth 1 the Supreme Judicial 
Court held that the tolling provisions generally applicable to statutes of 
limitations do not apply so as to toll the notice period contained in chapter 
258, at least where the cause of action against the public entity did not 
exist at common law. During the Survey year in Fearon v. Common-
wealth,2 the Court reaffirmed Weaver and indicated that, for purposes of 
tolling the notice period in Chapter 258, it was not inclined to make a 
distinction based on the existence of an action at common law.3 
In Fearon, the plaintiff's decedent drowned on April 10, 1980 when 
the motor vehicle in which he was a passenger was driven down a public 
boat launching ramp into a creek. 4 
The plaintiff, as executor of the decedent's estate, commenced suit on 
May 11, 1981.5 The plaintiff alleged that the Commonwealth, as owner 
of the property, was negligent in failing to mark the ramp and give 
adequate warning to drivers. 6 
The Commonwealth filed a motion for summary judgment on the 
grounds that notice was not given to the proper executive officer, the 
*JACQUELINE LILLARD ALLEN is an Associate in the Boston firm of Gitlin, Emmer 
& Kaplan. 
§ 1.1 1 387 Mass. 43, 438 N.E.2d 831 (1982). 
2 394 Mass. 50, 474 N.E.2d 162 (1985) 
3 /d. at 52-53, 474 N .E.2d at 164. 
4 /d. at 51,474 N.E.2d at 163. 
5 /d. at 51, 474 N.E.2d at 163-64. 
6 /d. at 51, 474 N.E.2d at 163. 
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Secretary of the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, within two 
years of the accident. 7 The Commonwealth supported its motion by an 
affidavit dated April 1, 1983 which stated that no such notice was re-
ceived.8 The superior court allowed the Commonwealth's motion and the 
plaintiff appealed. 9 
Upon review, the parties agreed that no proper notice was given within 
two years of the decedent's death as required by section 4 of chapter 
258. 10 The plaintiff maintained, however, that General Laws chapter 260, 
section 10, applied so as to toll the notice period. Section 10 provides 
that if a person entitled to bring an action dies before the running of the 
applicable statute of limitations, and the cause of action survives his or 
her death, the executor or administrator has an additional two years from 
the giving of his or her bond to commence an action. 11 
The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument and held that chapter 260, 
section 10 was not applicable to the notice provision of chapter 258, 
section 4. 12 The Court reasoned that the plaintiff's claim against the 
Commonwealth had no common law basis because it found no case where 
"the Commonwealth (as opposed to a municipality) was held liable at 
common law in circumstances falling within even an expansive view of 
the allegations of the complaint in this case."13 The Court added that it 
was not inclined to follow the suggestion in Weaver that the two year 
presentment requirement might be tolled by section 10 if the claim against 
the public employer had a common law origin. 14 The Court stated that 
because section 10 concerns only the commencement of actions and says 
nothing about notice or claim presentment, and because chapter 258, the 
exclusive remedy for tort claims against public employers, does not 
7 /d. at 51, 474 N.E.2d at 164. 
8 /d. Apparently the plaintiff had given notice to other agencies of the Commonwealth, 
and had been advised by the office of the Attorney General prior to the expiration of the 
two year notice period, that the Attorney General was investigating the claim and would 
file an answer. The plaintiff argued that the statements should estop the Commonwealth 
from claiming improper notice. The Court disagreed, but intimated that certain communi-
cations by the Attorney General's office might constitute estoppel if made within the two 
year presentment period. /d. at 53, 474 N.E.2d at 165 (citing Vasys v. Metropolitan Dist. 
Comm'n, 387 Mass. 51, 438 N.E.2d 836 (1982); Moran v. Mashpee, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 679, 
461 N.E.2d 1231 (1984)). For a discussion of Moran, see Donovan, Torts, 1984 ANN. SuRv. 
MASS. LAW§ 14.6, at 480. 
9 394 Mass. at 51, 474 N.E.2d at 164. 
1o /d. at 52, 474 N.E.2d at 164. 
II G.L. c. 260 § 10. 
12 394 Mass. at 52, 474 N.E.2d at 164. 
13 /d. 
14Jd. 
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contain a tolling provision, all actions governed by chapter 258 should 
be subject to the strict two year presentment requirement. 15 
In two companion cases the Court addressed the question of whether 
General Laws chapter 260, section 7, which tolls the statute of limitations 
during a plaintiff's minority, applies to the Tort Claims Act. In George 
v. Saugus, 16 the Court held that the presentment requirement of chapter 
258, section 4 was not tolled under chapter 260, section 7, by the plain-
tiff's minority. The Court reiterated its reasoning in Fearon.'7 In Her-
nandez v. Boston, 18 however, the Court concluded that the minority 
tolling provision of chapter 260, section 7 did apply to the commencement 
of actions under chapter 258. 19 
In light of the text and purpose of the notice provision in chapter 258, 
section 4, the holdings in Fearon and George, as well as the earlier 
holding in Weaver, contain the only reasonable interpretation of that 
provision. First, as the Court indicated, the text of section 4 makes no 
provision for tolling. 20 Second, the notice provision is designed to provide 
governmental entities with timely notice of claims against it for purposes 
of budgetary planning, timely investigation and possible early settlement. 
To allow tolling for a plaintiff's disabilities would contradict the wording 
of the statute and contravene its purposes. 
Although Hernandez appears to reach a contradictory conclusion, the 
decision is consistent with the Court's reasoning in Fearon and George. 
While Fearon and George dealt with the tolling of the notice requirement, 
Hernandez dealt with tolling of the limitations period for commencement 
of an action; therefore, the language of chapter 260, section 10 could 
logically apply. There is, however, a practical inconsistency resulting 
from these three decisions. The tolling provisions of chapter 260 are 
designed to protect claimants under a disability21 from losing a cause of 
15 /d. at 53, 474 N.E.2d at 164-65. 
16 394 Mass. 40, 474 N.E.2d 169 (1985). 
17 /d. at 41, 474 N.E.2d at 170. 
18 394 Mass. 45, 474 N.E.2d 166 (1985). 
19 /d. at 47, 474 N.E.2d at 167, (citing Irwin v. Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 770 n.ll, 467 N.E.2d 
1292, 1308 n.ll (1984)). 
20 As evidence that the General Court would have included such a provision if it so 
desired, see G.L. c. 84, § 19, which contains the thirty day notice provision for a suit based 
on a defect in a public way. In the case of the claimant's death, his or her administrator or 
executor is given an additional thirty days from the date of appointment to file the notice 
of claim. This tolling provision tracks very closely the language of c. 260, § 10, and could 
have been included in G.L. c. 258 if the General Court had intended to provide for tolling 
of the notice period. 
21 See G.L. c. 260, § 10 (tolling provision for death); /d. § 7 (tolling provision for youth 
and insanity). 
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action as a result of untimeliness by allowing additional time to commence 
action. Under chapter 258, section 4, however, such a claimant, regard-
less of his disability, must give notice within two years or be barred from 
bringing suit against a public employer. Giving that claimant additional 
time to bring suit under chapter 260 is of little practical significance if he 
is barred from bringing it due to untimely notice. 
§ 8.2. Dismissal In Federal Court - Enlargement of Limitations Period. 
General Laws chapter 260, section 32, provides that if an action is timely 
commenced but then dismissed for insufficient service of process due to 
unavoidable accident, or "for any matter of form," a plaintiff may com-
mence a new suit on the same cause of action within one year after the 
dismissal. 1 During the Survey year in Granahan v. Commonwealth, 2 the 
Appeals Court provided pleadings guidelines for practitioners attempting 
to invoke the grace period provided by chapter 260, section 32. 3 The 
court, however, left unresolved the issue of whether, and to what extent, 
section 32 is applicable to dismissal of an action in federal court. 
In Granahan, the plaintiffs alleged that on March 2, 1979, their dece-
dent, Sheila, was shot and killed after a series of events which should 
have alerted the defendants, various psychiatric care providers, that 
Sheila was in danger and in need of their care. 4 The plaintiffs timely filed 
a cause of action in federal court, but the federal suit was dismissed on 
September 12, 1983.5 Apparently, although these facts did not appear in 
the subsequent state court record, the United States District Court dis-
missed the action against the Commonwealth and its officials because 
such a suit is barred in federal court by the eleventh amendment to the 
United States Constitution.6 The federal claims against the non-govern-
ment defendants were dismissed because the federal court held that no 
federal cause of action was stated. 7 As a matter of discretion, the federal 
court likewise dismissed the pendant state claims against the non-gov-
ernment defendants. 8 The plaintiffs then commenced an action in superior 
court on December 20, 1983, well after the three year statute oflimitations 
period governing wrongful death actions had run.9 The defendants' mo-
§ 8.2. I G.L. c. 260, § 32. 
2 19 Mass. App. Ct. 617, 476 N.E.2d 266 (1985). 
3 /d. at 619~20, 476 N.E.2d at 268. 
4 /d. at 618, 476 N.E.2d at 267. 
5 /d. 
6 /d. at 618 n.3, 476 N.E.2d at 267 n.3 (citing Irwin v. Commiss'r of the Dep't of Youth 
Serv., 388 Mass. 810, 821, 448 N.E.2d 721, 728 (1983)). 
7 /d. 
8 /d. 
9 !d. at 619, 476 N.E.2d at 267; G.L. c. 229, § 2; G.L. c. 260, §§ 2A and 4. 
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tions to dismiss were allowed on the grounds that the action was not 
commenced within the limitations period. 10 
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that because their action had been 
timely filed but dismissed in federal court, chapter 260, section 32 should 
be applied to allow them to commence a new suit within one year of the 
dismissal.ll Without addressing the merits of the plaintiffs' arguments 
regarding the reach of chapter 260, section 32, the Appeals Court held 
that 
the failure of the plaintiffs to assert by pleading or affidavit in the state 
action any facts with respect to the filing of the federal action and its 
dismissal, in and of itself amounted to a failure to set forth the circum-
stances which might give rise to an application of section 32 if the dismissal 
of the federal action could be held to be merely "a matter of form. " 12 
The court further noted that the plaintiffs had never sought to amend 
their complaint, nor file an affidavit. 13 The dismissal of the action there-
fore was upheld.14 
Granahan makes clear that even in these days of notice pleading, a 
motion to dismiss will succeed where the complaint fails to set forth 
sufficient information to establish that the plaintiff may be entitled to 
relief. In Granahan, the complaint as drafted established that suit had 
not been filed within the applicable limitations period. Practitioners 
should take note that any time a complaint is filed beyond the statutory 
period, the circumstances which permit such late filing should be alleged 
in the complaint. This is true not only where chapter 260, section 32 is 
implicated, but also where other tolling provisions of chapter 260 are 
involved, or where, in a medical malpractice action, the malpractice was 
not discovered until after the usual limitations period had run. This 
approach is a sensible one because courts cannot be asked to guess as 
to the circumstances which may permit late filing. 
Granahan leaves unresolved the applicability of chapter 260, section 
32 to a dismissal in federal court. The court assiduously avoided a dis-
cussion of what constitutes "a matter of form" within the meaning of 
chapter 260, section 32, pointing out conflicting case law and inviting 
legislative action. Granahan makes clear, however, the guidelines to be 
followed should the statute be applied. 15 
§ 8.3. Collateral Estoppel - Preclusive Effect of Criminal Convictions 
in Civil Litigation. In two decisions during the Survey year, Aetna Cas-
10 19 Mass. App. Ct. at 619, 476 N.E.2d at 267. 
11 /d. at 618, 476 N.E.2d at 267. 
12 /d. at 619, 476 N.E.2d at 268 (emphasis in original). 
13 /d. at 619-20, 476 N.E.2d 268. 
14 /d. 
15 /d. at 620 n.6, 476 N.E.2d at 268 n.6. 
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ualty and Surety Co. v. Niziolck1 and Massachusetts Property Insurance 
Underwriting Association v. Norrington,2 the Supreme Judicial Court 
reassessed the issue of the admissibility and preclusive effect of a criminal 
conviction in subsequent civil litigation concerning the same events. Prior 
to these decisions the Court had followed the rule that "a defendant 
convicted of a crime is entitled to retry the question whether he actually 
committed the crime when that issue arises in a civil proceeding to which 
the Commonwealth is not a party; and the criminal judgment is not even 
evidence against him on the merits of the case."3 The new rule in Mas-
sachusetts is that "a party to a civil action against a former criminal 
defendant may invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel to preclude the 
criminal defendant from relitigating an issue decided in the criminal pros-
ecution. "4 Collateral estoppel, however, cannot be applied to preclude a 
person other than the criminal defendant from relitigating the issues 
decided in the criminal defendant's criminal trial.5 
In Aetna Casualty, an insurance company sought to recover insurance 
proceeds paid to a homeowner on a fire insurance policy because the 
homeowner had been convicted of burning insured property and larceny. 6 
As a result of the same fire, a second defendant also had been indicted, 
and pleaded guilty to arson and conspiracy to commit arson. 7 The insur-
ance company's suit alleged that both defendants had been guilty of 
burning the building and had caused Aetna to pay insurance proceeds to 
which the homeowner was not entitled.8 
The only contested issue of fact in the civil suit was whether the two 
men had intentionally caused the house to be burned.9 Aetna introduced 
the guilty pleas of one defendant as admissions against him, and that 
defendant was permitted to testify as to the reasons he entered those 
pleas. 10 No evidence of the homeowner's convictions was admitted. 11 
§ 8.3. 1 395 Mass. 737, 481 N.E.2d 1356 (1985). 
2 395 Mass. 751, 481 N.E.2d 1364 (1985). 
3 /d. at 753, 481 N.E.2d at 1366 (citing Minasian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 295 Mass. 1, 3, 
3 N.E.2d at 17, 18 (1936)). 
4 Aetna Casualty, 395 Mass. 742, 481 N.E.2d at 1360. A guilty plea by a criminal 
defendant is not treated the same because judgment following a guilty plea is not the result 
of full litigation; therefore, it does not have the preclusive effect of a judgment of guilty 
following trial. Such a plea is, however, an admission and as such may be introduced as 
evidence against the party who made it. /d. at 747, 481 N.E.2d at 1364. 
5 Massachusetts Property, 395 Mass. at 754, 481 N.E.2d at 1367. 
6 Aetna Casualty, 395 Mass. at 738, 481 N.E.2d at 1357. The homeowner had also been 
convicted of arson, but that conviction was overturned on appeal. /d. 
7 /d. at 738, 481 N.E.2d at 1358. 
8 /d. at 739, 481 N.E.2d at 1358. 
9 /d. 
10 /d. The Court upheld the introduction of these pleas as admissions. See supra note 4. 
11 395 Mass. at 739, 481 N.E.2d at 1358. 
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The trial judge reported the question of the effect of the homeowner's 
convictions to the Appeals Court, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted 
Aetna's request for direct appellate review. 12 Abandoning the traditional 
rule as stated in Minasian v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 13 the Court held 
that the criminal defendant was precluded from relitigating the issue 
decided at his criminal trial of whether he had burned down his house. 14 
The Court's decision appears to be based on two factors. First, the 
Court relied heavily on the fact that many jurisdictions, as well as the 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, have adopted the position that a 
criminal defendant is collaterally estopped from relitigating an issue con-
cluded in his or her criminal trial. 15 Second, the Court noted that its 
holding will result in decreased litigation costs, conservation of judicial 
resources, and will "perhaps most importantly, prevent the diminution 
of public confidence in our judicial system" that would result if civil 
juries, applying a less stringent standard, were to find that a convicted 
defendant had not, in fact, committed the crime of which he was con-
victed.16 
In the second case decided on this issue, Massachusetts Property 
Insurance Underwriting Association, 17 the Court made clear that its hold-
ing in Aetna Casualty was a limited one. Massachusetts Property had 
issued a homeowner's policy to John Person and Sandra Thomas which 
provided liability coverage for any claim against either insured for dam-
ages, but excluded from coverage damages which were expected or 
intended by the insured. 18 During the period of the policy, Person shot 
Thomas and killed her. 19 Although he was convicted of murder in the 
second degree, Person maintained that Thomas was shot when the gun 
discharged accidentally. 20 
Thomas' next of kin, Norrington, brought a wrongful death action 
against Person. 21 Massachusetts Property intervened in that suit and, 
after Person's conviction, filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a 
declaration that Thomas' death was caused by its insured's (Person's) 
intentional act, and therefore the insurer had no obligation to defend or 
12 /d. at 740, 481 N.E.2d at 1358-59. 
13 285 Mass. 1, 3 N.E.2d 17 (1936). See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
14 395 Mass. at 742, 481 N.E.2d at 1360. 
15 /d. at 742-43, 481 N.E.2d at 1360 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 
§ 85(2) (1982)). 
16 /d. The issue of collateral estoppel must be raised prior to litigation, or it will be 
waived. /d. at 746, 481 N.E.2d at 1362. 
17 395 Mass. 751, 481 N.E.2d 1364 (1985). 
18 /d. at 751-52, 481 N.E.2d at 1365. 
19 /d. 
20 /d. at 752, 481 N .E.2d at 1364. 
21 /d. 
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pay any judgment against Person in the wrongful death action. 22 Massa-
chusetts Property filed a motion for summary judgment seeking this 
declaratory relief and the superior court reported the question to the 
Appeals Court. 23 The Supreme Judicial Court allowed the plaintiff's 
motion for direct appellate review. 
In deciding whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded Nor-
rington (the plaintiff in the civil action) from relitigating the issue decided 
in Person's criminal trial, the Court applied the traditional collateral 
estoppel analysis. The Court assumed, without deciding, that two of the 
three criteria for collateral estoppel were satisfied; the issue decided in 
Person's cri!llinal trial was identical to the jssue on which the existence 
of insurance coverage depended, and there was a final judgment on the 
merits. 24 
The Court found, however, that the third criterion, that the party 
against whom the prior decision is asserted must have been a party or in 
privity with a party to the prior adjudication, was not satisfied. 25 In this 
case, the insurance company sought to preclude Norrington from reliti-
gating the issue whether Person intended to kill Thomas. The Court 
declined to allow such a preclusion because Norrington was not a party 
to Person's criminal trial, nor was he in privity with a party in that case. 26 
The rules formulated in Aetna Casualty and Massachusetts Property 
are sensible. The Court has carried out the analysis traditionally em-
ployed in deciding whether collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of 
an issue, rather than perpetuating the old rule which permitted a con-
victed defendant to retry the question of his or her guilt in a civil pro-
ceeding. It appears, however, that the Court was more concerned with 
relieving the stress on an already overloaded litigation system than bring-
ing this issue in line with the common principles of collateral estoppel. 
In the effort to lower the cost of litigation and reduce court backlogs, 
these opinions are a step in the right direction. At the same time, the 
Court has been careful to preserve the due process rights of litigants who 
were not participants in the previous trial. In keeping with the traditional 
collateral estoppel analysis, persons who were not parties, or in privity 
22 /d. 
23 Id. 
24 /d. at 753, 481 N.E.2d at 1366. An appeal from Person's conviction was pending at 
the time of this decision, but the Court stated that Person's conviction by a jury was a final 
judgment for collateral estoppel purposes. Id. at 754, 481 N.E.2d at 1366. In light of its 
finding that the third requirement of collateral estoppel was not satisfied, the Court brushed 
this issue aside. It seems clear, however, that appellate reversal of a conviction would 
negate the preclusive effect of the underlying conviction in a civil trial. 
25 /d. at 753, 481 N.E.2d at 1366 (citing Bernard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust and 
Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 813, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (1942)). 
26 /d. at 754, 481 N.E.2d at 1366. 
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with parties, to the criminal action, will not be precluded from relitigating 
issues resolved in the criminal trial. 
In conclusion, the new rule concerning the preclusive effect of a crim-
inal conviction in a subsequent civil proceeding better serves the efficient 
administration of justice by avoiding relitigation of issues, while affording 
all litigants sufficient opportunity to argue their positions to the court. 
The rule also protects persons from being sued twice for the same cause 
and prevents persons who have had an opportunity to litigate an issue 
from again drawing that issue into controversy. 
9
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